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I. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: ONE 





urely a list of the most important multilateral law-making treaties would 
include the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. To that 
list might be added the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of War and 
numerous human rights, environmental and arms control conventions. 
But by many indicia, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) is one of the greatest achievements in international law-mak-
ing. The Convention provides a virtual constitution for over two-thirds of 
planet Earth, it resolved disagreements about oceans law going back at least 
four centuries, it deals with literally hundreds of substantive and procedural 
issues in its 302 Articles and nine annexes. On dispute settlement, it created 
an important new international court—the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea—along with two new arbitral procedures and a new concili-
ation procedure. It also created two important new functional international 
institutions, the International Sea-Bed Authority and the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
UNCLOS was negotiated during the Cold War, but remarkably with 
great power cooperation setting aside Cold War disagreements. With over 
150 participating countries, it was one of the first major law-making treaties 
to include the post-colonial world.1 It is one of the most important environ-
mental treaties, it dealt successfully with an entirely new international issue, 
that of deep seabed mineral resources, and it overcame a decade long failure 
of agreement on these resources through an innovative United Nations-led 
renegotiation of Part XI on deep seabed mining. It also developed an im-
portant new procedure in international law-making negotiations referred to 
as “the gentleman’s agreement” or “consensus procedure” and the related 
“package deal.” The Convention oversaw the greatest expansion of coastal 
                                                                                                                      
1. There were also 45 observers participating at sessions of the conference represent-
ing states and territories, specialized agencies, and intergovernmental organizations. And 
there were 57 non-governmental organizations participating as observers, from the Inter-













nation resource rights in history, and it added to oceans law the concept of 
archipelagic states for certain mid-ocean island nations. Its negotiation, from 
early beginning in the mid-1960s through the final successful renegotiation 
of Part XI in 1994, consumed more than a quarter century. It broadly reflects 
community common interest rather than special interests, and today it serves 
as a framework agreement for newer issues and remaining oceans govern-
ance challenges, and is broadly in force with 167 State parties plus the Euro-
pean Union. That is an achievement which stands in sharp contrast with the 
sad legacy of violent conflict and narrow nationalism all too evident in the 
twentieth and now the twenty-first century. 
 
B. The Convention and the Rule of Law 
 
The rule of law matters. Law serves to provide clear expectations as to juris-
dictional boundaries and national rights and obligations so necessary for co-
operative relations, economic life, and more broadly, human creativity. Thus, 
we need to know the breadth of the territorial sea, who manages coastal 
stocks of fish, the rules for straits transit and a myriad of other rules to func-
tion cooperatively in the oceans. If some states claim three nautical miles for 
the territorial sea and others two hundred nautical miles, we simply do not 
know the basic rules. But of even greater importance, the rule of law serves 
as a check on power. An oceans space driven by out-of-control national 
claims and a “might makes right” credo can neither serve community com-
mon interests nor restrain conflict. The Law of the Sea Convention is a re-
markable achievement in the rule of law—providing both stability and a 
check on power. 
 
C. The Background of the Negotiations 
 
The global context leading to the successful law of the sea negotiations was 
complex. It included four centuries of failure to functionally separate re-
source and navigational oceans issues with a preoccupation instead on a sin-
gle line in the oceans focused on the breadth of the territorial sea. Since ef-
fective coastal fisheries management required a broad territorial sea and nav-
igational freedom a narrow territorial sea, such a single line could neither 
serve the common interest nor could it work as the basis for agreement. 
Because of this failure to functionally separate the issues of fishery manage-
ment and navigation, the First and Second United Nations Conferences on 












new concept of the continental shelf and rules for the high seas, simply could 
not reach agreement on the appropriate breadth of the territorial sea. 
Other factors converging for a comprehensive new approach included 
the United States and Soviet Union discovery of the crucial straits issue—
that transit through the more than 100 straits used for international naviga-
tion of critical importance for global commerce and military transit and, as 
such, the rules developed for innocent passage through the territorial sea 
were hopeless for straits—the belated discovery of the environment during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, a host of newly independent states that wished 
to participate in shaping oceans law, and, as the final catalyst, a speech by 
Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Permanent Representative of Malta to the United 
Nations, electrifying developing countries with the prospect of little-known 
deep seabed resources as the “common heritage of mankind.” 
 
D. Assessing the Common Interest 
 
Now, how should we assess the common interest in international oceans law 
matters and whether the Convention does a good job? The answer requires 
functional division of oceans uses. Uses such as navigation and laying of 
cables are uses, which, for all practical purposes given the size of the world’s 
oceans, can be repeated over and over without scarcity. Such uses are also 
of enormous benefit to the world as a whole, with trade moving through 
oceans transportation driving the global economy. There is no case that these 
uses should be controlled by coastal nations. Nor do these uses require prop-
erty rights in oceans space. Moreover, coastal nation efforts to control ship 
construction and operation for those transiting off their coast would create 
an impossible hodgepodge of standards. It would also threaten access for 
the more than half of all coastal nations in the world that are “zone-locked” by 
the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone adopted by UNCLOS.2 That 
                                                                                                                      
2. The author gave the first speech on this concept of “zone-locked” states at the final 
Geneva session of the Seabeds Committee in 1973. He was as astounded as everyone else 
at the meeting to learn that a majority of all coastal nations would have no access to any ocean 
they faced without going through the 200-mile EEZ’s of neighboring states. He first dis-
covered the problem over lunch with the Thai Representative to the Seabeds Committee. 
Thinking there might be other nations with the same access problem as Thailand, he asked 
the State Department Geographer to send him a list of states he termed as “zone-locked.” 
The result was this discovery of the enormous number of “zone-locked” states so crucial as 
to why coastal states should not be granted the ability to control vessel-source pollution in 
the 200-nautical mile EEZ. The speech effectively ended the effort by a few states to include 













is, counter to all our initial instincts about what a “coastal nation” is, nations 
such as Thailand, and over half of all other coastal nations, would have no access 
to the oceans without going through the economic zones of neighboring 
states. Understandably, this large block of coastal nations does not want to 
be turned into the functional equivalent of land-locked states with access 
controlled by their neighbors. For these and other reasons, environmental, 
safety and liability issues in shipping must be addressed through a single in-
ternational entity rather than a myriad of coastal states. Today, given impetus 
by the decisions at UNCLOS, the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) carries out these tasks. Similarly, the global interest in access from 
one ocean area to another through the narrow strait choke points supported 
a new regime of straits transit passage with full navigational freedom 
through, over and under the more than 100 straits used for international 
navigation. 
But fisheries, the oil and gas of the continental margins and deep seabed 
minerals all are exhaustible, and require the equivalent of property rights. 
Absent some management regime coextensive with the range of individual 
stocks, fisheries will be decimated through a free-for-all; and this was hap-
pening. This is the well-known “common pool” problem in economic the-
ory. The solution was to provide a management regime coextensive with the 
major groupings of fish stocks—coastal, anadromous, catadromous and 
highly migratory—and to provide for appropriate access rights and environ-
mental standards for each. Since coastal nations already controlled a signifi-
cant territorial sea off their coasts, the management of coastal stocks, and 
preferential access rights for these stocks, could easily and appropriately be 
given to coastal states. Similarly, since anadromous and catadromous stocks 
depended on a life-cycle relation even with a coastal state’s internal waters, 
the relevant coastal state, termed the host state, was the obvious answer for 
management of these stocks. Highly migratory stocks, on the other hand, 
required some degree of regional management throughout their range within 
and beyond areas of coastal state jurisdiction. 
With respect to the oil and gas of the seafloor on the continental margins, 
these resources too needed property rights. Since the coastal nations already 
controlled part of the continental shelf, through the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, it was appropriate to turn over these resources to the 
coastal nations. Indeed, decentralized global development of these resources 
was also likely more efficient than an effort to centralize their management. 
And with respect to both coastal fish stocks and the oil and gas of the con-












without assigning these to the coastal states. That is precisely what was done 
by the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone under Article 57 of the 
Convention and the “extended” continental shelf under Article 76 of the 
Convention. 
But, when it came to the mineral resources of the deep ocean floor, prop-
erty rights were needed for development even though there was no relation 
with any coastal nation. The appropriate answer was to create a new inter-
national functional agency, which would provide the equivalent of property 
rights and regulate environmental issues in the development of these mineral 
resources that were beyond areas of national jurisdiction. That is precisely 
what Part XI, and its renegotiation in 1994, achieved. While non-experts hy-
pothesize a “fishing approach” to deep seabed minerals, that is simply turn-
ing firms loose to gather the resources like they would catch fish, the billions 
of dollars required for a seabed mining operation coupled with the reality 
that the refining operation for manganese nodules must be tailored to min-
erals from a particular site requires security of legal tenure not consistent 
with a “fishing approach.” That, in turn, requires the equivalence of interna-
tionally recognized property rights. 
Assessing the Convention by these standards, it was a remarkable success 
in supporting community common interest. The core genius of the Conven-
tion was the functional separation of oceans space by different oceans uses. 
Indeed, the political core of the Convention was an extension of coastal state 
resources rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone and extended 
shelf while fully retaining navigational freedom in these areas, and adding a 
new critically needed regime for navigational freedom through, over, and 
under straits used for international navigation. This solution could both re-
solve the need for extending management regimes for fisheries while fully 
protecting navigational freedom. The same functional division, coupled with 
reasonable limitations on qualifying islands, resulted in acceptance of the ar-
chipelagic concept for certain mid-ocean islands nations such as Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Fiji and the Bahamas. That is, acceptance of broad archipe-
lagic state control of archipelagic waters subject to appropriate protection of 
navigation through these large oceans areas, including protecting naviga-
tional freedom in broad corridors through the archipelagoes. And the crea-
tion of a new regime for international recognition of the equivalent of prop-
erty rights for exploration and exploitation of deep seabed minerals com-















E. Substantive Contributions Protecting Navigational Freedom 
 
UNCLOS has been of enormous importance both in resolving ancient 
oceans disputes and in modernizing oceans law for the twenty-first century. 
Most importantly, it functionally separated oceans uses to permit an oceans 
law in the common interest. No longer would the choice be between pro-
tecting coastal fish stocks or navigational freedom. The 200-nautical mile 
economic zone places coastal stocks under a coastal state management re-
gime throughout the range of most such stocks, while simultaneously pre-
serving high seas navigational freedom in the zone. This was the singular 
genius of the Convention; enabling success where there had been only failure 
when the issue was drawing a single territorial sea that could never accom-
modate both needs. But the Convention went on to modernize and improve 
navigational regimes in multiple ways. These include: 
 
 Agreement on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea as twelve nau-
tical miles (Article 3); 
 Clarification of the regime of “innocent passage” through the territorial 
sea, including providing an exhaustive list of activities which would make 
passage non-innocent (Article 19(2)), and clarifying that coastal states 
may not make laws and regulations for the design, construction, manning 
or equipment of foreign ships passing through the territorial sea (Article 
21(2)). Importantly, this provision prevents an impossible situation for 
shipping, avoiding a hodgepodge of national laws and regulations rather 
than the international standards as set by the IMO; 
 A critically important new Part III on Straits Used for International Nav-
igation providing a regime of transit passage through, over and under 
such straits rather than the inappropriate “innocent passage” regime;  
 A new Part IV recognizing special provisions for archipelagic states 
while both appropriately limiting the concept to certain island nations, 
and providing full high seas navigational freedom in broad corridors 
through the archipelagoes; 
 A new 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which the 
coastal state not only controls the natural resources of the zone, but also 
“other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the 
zone,” while at the same time retaining full high seas navigational free-












 An updating of high seas law (Part VII). In connection, it should be 
noted that Article 88 on “Reservation of the high seas for peaceful pur-
poses” provides no new limits on warships or military activities, but ra-
ther simply restates the existing ban on aggression as set forth in Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter. There was no interest as the negoti-
ations progressed in expanding the negotiations to arms control; 
 A special provision for coastal state authority over vessel-source pollu-
tion in “Ice-Covered Areas” (Articles 234, 236 and 297(1)); and 
 A completely new regime and machinery for dispute resolution, includ-
ing the creation of an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, two 
new arbitral procedures and a new conciliation procedure. Importantly, 
Part XV on “Settlement of Disputes,” includes the “prompt release of 
vessels and crews” (Article 292). 
 
F. Challenges to Navigational Freedom Today 
 
These important provisions for navigational freedom are of the utmost im-
portance in protecting global trade, one of the core mechanisms for global 
economic growth, and for lessening the risks of conflict involving efforts to 
assert jurisdiction over warships and other vessels entitled to sovereign im-
munity. For “zone-locked” states, the absence of these navigational free-
doms would mean losing access to the oceans as though the state were land-
locked. Indeed, without the clear legal recognition of these fundaments of 
navigational freedom, UNCLOS would not have been possible. Sadly, how-
ever, the international community must be diligent in combating the chal-
lenges to navigational freedom that still exist. These include: 
 
 Aberrant and vague “area” claims such as the old “Libyan Line of 
Death,” the Chilean “Mar Presencial,” China’s “nine-dashed-line” and 
North Korea’s 50-mile security zone claim; 
 Excessive straight baseline claims; 
 Excessive claims concerning innocent passage in the territorial sea; par-
ticularly claims concerning consent or notification for warships; claims 
which have never been accepted as part of oceans law and which have 
been jointly rebutted by the United States and Russia in the Jackson Hole 













 Illegal claims asserting ship construction or operation standards for 
transit through the territorial sea or the economic zone which have not 
previously been adopted through the IMO mechanism; and 
 Claims limiting full high seas navigational freedoms in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. 
 
For the most part aberrant and vague area claims and claims beyond permis-
sible limits for the territorial sea and economic zone seem to be slowly re-
ceding as the Convention takes greater hold each and every year. The more 
concerning problems for the future likely relate to the “character” of each of 
these zonal areas in UNCLOS. We must not permit gradual encroachments 
to roll back the core UNCLOS compromise of extended coastal state re-
source rights in return for full navigational freedom in the EEZ and straits 
transit rights through, over, and under straits used for international naviga-
tion. 
 
G. Recommendations for Protecting Navigational Freedom 
 
Some of the important actions we must take to protect navigational freedom, 
which is quite literally the most important common heritage in the world’s 
oceans, are as follows: 
 
 Above all, we must never reopen the navigational provisions in UN-
CLOS. UNCLOS was a remarkable package and these critical naviga-
tional provisions must never be lost. Because of the enormous success of UN-
CLOS, as well as its design as a framework agreement permitting consistent imple-
menting agreements, it would be an enormous mistake to seek to renegotiate, or reopen, 
UNCLOS itself. In UNCLOS, the international community has an ex-
traordinary success! 
 Nations should work together to jointly coordinate the sending of pro-
test notes to countries that are not complying with UNCLOS. This com-
pliance obligation should not be left to a few maritime powers. 
 More nations should copy the U.S. practice of conducting freedom of 
navigation activities in relation to illegal claims. 
 For my own country, the United States, we must adhere to the Conven-
tion fully with Senate advice and consent in order to more effectively 













H. The Problem of United States Non-Adherence 
 
The United States was one of the most active and influential participants in 
the successful negotiations leading to UNCLOS. This is particularly true in 
the period through the adoption of the Informal Single Negotiating Text, 
representing the great bulk of the present Convention. The United States 
was absolutely correct in not accepting the flawed Part XI as originally 
adopted in 1982, though it bears some responsibility in the ongoing late-
stage confusion regarding the negotiation over Part XI, particularly in the 
tenth and eleventh sessions in 1981 and 1982. The United States should also 
have moved more expeditiously to reopen negotiations on Part XI when that 
became feasible after the 1982 failure on this Part. Nonetheless, Part XI was 
fatally flawed in the 1982 version and would not have served the interest of 
any state, developed or developing, as mining simply would never have taken 
place. As such, Part XI needed to be changed and United States firmness on 
this point served the world well. 
President Ronald Reagan’s conditions for U.S. acceptance eventually 
were met. After which, the United States strongly supported the Convention, 
and it was promptly submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. Subse-
quently, every U.S. President of both parties has supported U.S. adherence.3 
Sadly, despite repeated favorable votes and recommendations from the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, for over two decades the Convention has 
languished in the Senate and has yet to come up for a vote in the full Senate. 
The reason is opposition from an isolationist faction endlessly repeating a 
patina of falsehoods about the Convention; a faction which at least has 
seemed to Senate leadership to have a blocking third in votes and has thus 
been able to prevent Senate advice and consent under Article II, section 2, 
of the United States Constitution requiring treaty concurrence by a two-
thirds majority. 
The United States will at some point fully adhere to the Convention. 
Every oceans industry interest in the United States supports the Convention, 
from the oil majors to the environmentalists. Indeed, the only opposition is 
ideologically based, rather than interest based, and even then is senseless un-
less rooted in inaccuracies about the Convention. In the meantime, the 
United States accepts the normative provisions of the Convention as cus-
tomary international law, and the United States Navy has one of the best 
records in the world in careful compliance. 
                                                                                                                      
















UNCLOS is truly a gift to the World and its greatest legacy is protecting 
navigational freedom on the World’s oceans. That is a legacy to protect! 
Thank you. 
 
